### 1AC

#### The following is a fictional depiction of the United States federal government increasing prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws. All characters and events depicted are entirely fictitious, but any similarity to actual debates or debaters, living or dead, may not be completely coincidental…

Sutton and Pindar, 2000—Senior Lecturer in Film and TV Studies at Roehampton University; award-winning poet (Paul and Ian, “Translator’s Introduction,” *The Three Ecologies*, 1-5, dml)

When he gave the world Professor Challenger, Conan Doyle was already justly famous for creating Sherlock Holmes. He wrote his two Challenger collections - early examples of a new genre that eventually would be called ‘science fiction’ at the turn of the last century, The Lost World in 1912 and The Poison Belt the following year. Unlike Sherlock Holmes, however, Challenger is almost completely forgotten, although the stereotype he embodied continues to subsist in books, television and film. He is rational, scientific man at the dawn of a new century, confident of his superiority over nature, which is ably demonstrated in the story to which Guattari and Deleuze allude: ‘When the Earth Screamed’. Challenger has all the arrogance of Sherlock Holmes but none of his charm. He takes an almost sadistic delight in experimenting on the natural world and despises his much abused, Watson-like stooge Edward Malone and anyone else who dares to question his superior intelligence (‘Clearly a typical victim of the Jehovah complex,’ observes one of his critics).2 He is a caricature, of course, but it would not be far-fetched to say that the twentieth century was the century of men like Challenger.

In ‘When the Earth Screamed’ Challenger argues that the Earth is an organism, much like a sea-urchin, hard on the outside but soft inside. Human beings are a fungal growth of which the planet is completely unaware. Surrounded by sceptics, he proposes to prove his point by vigorously stimulating the creature’s sensory cortex, that is, driving a shaft into the centre of the Earth, thereby gaining its attention (for his experiments are always little more than outlets for his insufferable egotism). Having, he supposes, proven his superiority over the rest of animal- and humankind, the Earth is his final and finest challenge: ‘I propose to let the Earth know that there is at least one person, George Edward Challenger, who calls for attention - who, indeed, insists upon attention.’ After a brief lecture to a restless audience, Challenger presses the ‘electric button’ that sends an enormous iron dart into ‘the nerve ganglion of old Mother Earth’. There is

the most horrible yell that ever was heard . . . a howl in which pain, anger, menace, and the outraged majesty of Nature all blended into one hideous shriek. For a full minute it lasted, a thousand sirens in one, paralysing all the great multitude with its fierce insistence, and floating away through the still summer air until it went echoing along the whole south coast and even reached our French neighbours across the Channel. No sound in history has ever equalled the cry of the injured Earth.

Much to Challenger’s satisfaction, an ‘enormous spout of a vile treacly substance of the consistency of tar’ erupts from the ground to soak the assembled Press, and then the excavation is buried by a 50-foot pyramid of earth.

The story ends with Challenger’s transformation from lunatic to genius - ‘Challenger the super scientist, Challenger the arch-pioneer, Challenger the first man of all men whom Mother Earth had been compelled to recognize’ - although it remains unclear what practical benefit the experiment had other than to gratify his terrifying ego or to demonstrate that nothing can ‘defend Mother Earth from intrusive Challengers’. In The Three Ecologies Guattari objects that we have challenged the Earth enough and are now on the brink of ecocide. After a century of unparalleled scientific and technological progress we have made our presence known to the planet in the most dramatic and self-defeating fashion. Had the Earth’s response to man’s ‘stimulation’ been as localized as it is in Conan Doyle’s story - a retaliatory spurt of black tar - we would be safe; but instead we are faced with a very different kind of ‘feedback’: a bewilderingly complex array of interrelated and unpredictably erratic fluctuations over which we have little or no control and which remind us that the whole world is a giant ecosystem with a sensitive biosphere that has taken 4.5 billion years to evolve.

Our Challenger-like contempt for nature has driven thousands of species to extinction already, insects, other invertebrates and micro-organisms in the main, although birds and larger mammals such as the elephant and the tiger are also at risk, and it is not fanciful to suppose that eventually we might deprive even ourselves of an ecological niche.3 The Earth’s environment is composed of a multiplicity of such niches, each of which is a potential home for life forms. (As Guattari reminds us, the etymology of ‘eco’ is the Greek word oikos, meaning ‘home’.) We have upset the delicate symbiosis between ourselves and nature, with largely unforeseeable results.

In the oceans, for instance, overfishing, increased pollution, and rising temperatures as a result of human activity have resulted in the spread of unknown or unidentified infectious ‘agents’ that have led to the mass mortality of fish, sea mammals, tropical corals and sea-water plants. The biodiversity of the oceans is seriously threatened by mysterious pathogens - viruses, bacteria, fungi and other parasites - that wipe out whole populations. These pathogens are making cross-species leaps of the sort that the Professor Challenger of A Thousand Plateaus would be better able to explain, and have exploded the popular belief that the Earth’s oceans are so vast they would remain relatively immune from mankind’s influence. Whereas Nietzsche could still find comfort in the analogy of the world as a ‘sea of forces’ that never expends itself, ‘eternally flooding back’ (‘the sea will cast it up again’), we can have no such faith in our diseased and toxic oceans with their oil slicks and giant algae blooms visible from space.a There can be little doubt that around the world increased pollution, global warming, deforestation, desertification and the loss of biodiversity are anthropogenic, or that the motor of this generalized impoverishment of the biosphere is capitalism.

#### But we’re getting ahead of ourselves. Perhaps this will clarify.

Sutton and Pindar, 2000—Senior Lecturer in Film and TV Studies at Roehampton University; award-winning poet (Paul and Ian, “Translator’s Introduction,” *The Three Ecologies*, 5-17, dml)

The latter half of the twentieth century was a period of intense globalization. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dominant mode of economic interaction and transaction was the capitalist system, with its emphasis on the free market. This ideology of unrestricted competition has resulted in the widespread plunder of natural resources, particularly fossil fuels such as oil or coal, but it isn’t just the natural environment that is threatened. Poorer countries are forced to sell their labour extremely cheaply in order to enter the global marketplace, and have exploited their natural resources without a thought for sustainability. Meanwhile in the pollution-choked cities of the developed world the most vulnerable in society are living increasingly insecure and alienated lives. Globalization has given rise to ‘exploitative practices that perpetuate a quiet violence on low-income labour and other vulnerable groups such as the poor, women and children. New technological and scientific advances that could be used to liberate human potential remain instead in the service of a capitalist drive for profitability. A third of the world’s population continues to suffer from massive poverty and malnutrition, while at the same time there has been an increase in global wealth unprecedented in the history of humankind.

The increasing globalization of all areas of our lives is not being directed by one particular capitalist organization, party or country - not even the USA, despite the fact that the model which most of the world is confronted with is the American Way of Life. Post-industrial capitalism - which Guattari calls Integrated World Capitalism (IWC) - is delocalized and deterritorialized to such an extent that it is impossible to locate the source of its power.6 IWC’s most potent weapon for achieving social control without violence is the mass media. For instance, everyone nowadays has a television set. Many people in the Third World will have televisions long before they have proper irrigation. With the worldwide domination of capitalism came a parallel expansion in communications technology. Instant global communication became a reality leading to the creation of a ‘global village’: the world as a single community linked by telecommunications. The mass media is involved in the creation of demand, so there will always be a market for capital investment. A new type of individual is being shaped and moulded by the unseen pressure of market forces.

In The Three Ecologies Guattari argues that we are being ‘mentally manipulated through the production of a collective, mass-media subjectivity’. That there might be a need for a mental ecologies is one of the most profound ideas in this short book. Guattari’s contention is that IWC is not only destroying the natural environment and eroding social relations, but is also engaged in a far more insidious and invisible ‘penetration of people’s attitudes, sensibility and minds’ (Guattari and Negri, 1990: 53). Human subjectivity, in all its uniqueness - what Guattari calls its ‘singularity’ - is as endangered as those rare species that are disappearing from the planet every day. It is up to us to resist this mass-media homogenization, which is both desingularizing and infantalizing, and instead invent new ways to achieve the resingularization of existence. It is not enough to take to the streets and wave placards, an entire mental ecology is necessary in order not to give IWC our unconscious assent. But to illustrate how IWC infiltrates and saturates the unconscious, let us return briefly to its effect on the environment.

It might have been better for us if the Earth had screamed, as it did for Professor Challenger. Instead it has gone eerily silent. Take, for example, the population of songbirds in the British countryside. In 1972 there were an estimated,7.72 million skylarks in Britain. By 1996 there were only about 3.09 million. In a short space of time almost 60 per cent had disappeared.s It is very rare to hear a skylark today, as it is to hear other once common songbirds such as the song thrush or the blackbird. Their ecological niches or homes hedgerows, heaths, ponds, meadows, moors and marshes have been eroded by the intensive use of agri-chemicals and pesticides which have decimated their food supply. Birds sing to mark out their territory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 312), so it is only to be expected that the singing has stopped.

It is a sound that Thomas Hardy, in another century, could take for granted: ‘the voice of a weak bird singing a trite old evening song that might doubtless have been heard on the hill at the same hour, and with t}e selfsame trills, quavers, and breves . . . for centuries untold’ (Hardy, 1987:71). Guattari calls this conjunction of a recognisable melodic formula and a territory a ‘refrain’, and ‘the simplest examples of refrains delimiting existential Territories can be found in the ethology of numerous bird species’ (1995a: 15).

There are many refrains in our own lives as well, a favourite song, the advertising jingle that we can’t get out of our heads, even singing to the radio, for radio and television sets create ‘sound walls’ around us (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 311). In The Three Ecologies Guattari argues that ‘Individuals are "captured" by their environment, by ideas, tastes, models, ways of being, the images that are constantly injected into them, and even by the refrains that go round and round in their heads.’ In fact, surrounded by all these different refrains which pass through us, it is difficult to know where, or rather, who ‘we’ are, especially when the most dominant refrains are provided by IWC’s ideological arm, the mass media.

The machinic enslavement of television is a good example. Do we really use television or does it use us? Are we not in danger of becoming intrinsic component pieces in a much larger machine? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 458). As Guattari remarks in Chaosmosis:

When I watch television, I exist at the intersection: (1) of a perceptual fascination provoked by the screen’s luminous animation which borders on the hypnotic; (2) of a captive relation with the narrative content of the programme, associated with a lateral awareness of surrounding events (water boiling on the stove, a child’s cry, the telephone . . .); (3) of a world of phantasms occuping my daydreams. My feeling of personal identity is thus pulled in different directions. How can I maintain a relative sense of unicity, despite the diversity of components of subjectification that pass through me? It’s a question of the refrain that fixes me in front of the screen. (1995a: 16-17)

IWC seeks to gain power over us by ‘controlling and neutralizing the maximum number of existential refrains’, thereby determining the limits within which we think, feel and live; a process of ‘existential contraction’. We don’t get out much; we tend to think what everyone else thinks, feel the same as everyone else; a strange passivity haunts our lives.e As market-driven technologies provide new, ever more effective means of modifying our subjectivity at deeper and deeper levels, we are becoming more homogenized. The world is shrinking, and so are we. ‘A vast majority of individuals are placed in a situation in which their personality is dwindling, their intentions are rapidly losing all consistency, the quality of their relations with others is dulled’ (Guattari, 1989c: 19). For Guattari, ‘consistency’ is indissociable from heterogeneity, and much of The Three Ecologies is concerned with attaining consistency again, becoming heterogeneous, resingularizing ourselves, affirming our legitimate difference both from each other and from a notional ‘Self’.

It is a question of making a pragmatic intervention in one’s own life in order to escape from the dominant capitalistic subjectivity. The objective of the new ecological practices that Guattari outlines is to ‘activate isolated and repressed singularities that are turning around on themselves’. It isn’t a question of exchanging one model or way of life for another, but of ‘respond[ing] to the event as the potential bearer of new constellations of Universes of reference’ (1995a: 18). The paradox is this: although these Universes are not pre-established reference points or models, with their discovery one realizes they were always already there, but only a singular event could activate them.

In Chaosmosis, Guattari uses the example of a patient who is stuck in a rut, going round and round in circles. One day, on the spur of the moment, he decides to take up driving again. As he does so he immediately activates an existentializing refrain that opens up ‘new fields of virtuality’ for him. He renews contact with old friends, drives to familiar spots, and regains his self-confidence (1995a: l7). This is what Guattari calls ‘a processual exploitation of event-centred "singularities"‘ (1995a: 7). It is notable that Guattari seems to have experienced something similar when he learned to drive at the comparatively late age of 35. His life changed dramatically when he got his driving licence: ‘I became more independent, which eventually led, among other things, to a divorce’ (1995a: 241; 1989a: 244).

Guattari’s favourite - Proustian - example of an existentializing refrain is the effect on Swann of the ‘little phrase’ from the Vinteuil sonata. This refrain has ‘a sort of rc-creative influence’ upon Swann; he is ‘like a confirmed invalid in whom, all of a sudden, a change of air and surroundings, or a new course of treatment, or sometimes an organic change in himself, spontaneous and unaccountable, seems to have brought about such an improvement in his health that he begins to envisage the possibility, hitherto beyond all hope, of starting to lead belatedly a wholly different life’.ro An existential Territory can either become stratified and trapped in ‘deathly repetitions’, as in the case of the tele-spectator in front of the screen watching advertisements, or is capable of being reactivated by a singular event, as in the case of the patient who takes up driving.

The idea of a singular event in one’s life, which may be almost imperceptible but which has enormous repercussions, is borrowed from modern physics. It was apparent to the physicist James Clerk Maxwell as long ago as the nineteenth century that singular events or points might have a political - or what Guattari would call micropolitical - application and a catalyzing power:

the system has a quantity of potential energy, which is capable of being transformed into motion, but which cannot begin to be so transformed till the system has reached a certain configuration, to attain which requires an expenditure of work, which in certain cases may be infinitessimally small, and in general bears no definite proportion to the energy developed in consequence thereof. For example, a rock loosed by frost and balanced on a singular point of the mountain-side, the little spark which kindles the great forest, the little word which sets the world a-fighting, the little sample which prevents a man from doing his will, the little spore which blights all the potatoes, the little gemmule which makes us philosophers or idiots. Every existence above a certain rank has its singular points: the higher the rank, the more of them. At these points, influences whose physical magnitude is too small to be taken account of by a finite being, may produce results of the greatest importance. All great results produced by human endeavour depend on taking advantage of these singular points when they occur.lt

Guattari is fascinated by the non-human aspect of subjectivity. Singularity is not individuality, although it is about being singular. It operates at a pre-personal, pre-individual level. In The Three Ecologies he compares our interior life or ‘interiority’ to a crossroads where several components of subjectification meet to make up who we think we are. The resingularization of subjectivity, the liberation of singularities that are repressed by a dominant and dominating mass-media subjectivity, has nothing to do with individuals.t2

Nevertheless, an expenditure of work is necessary in order for us to extend our existential Territories. One of the most insistent refrains in The Three Ecologies is that we must abandon scientific (or pseudo-scientific) paradigms and return to aesthetic ones. We need to continually reinvent our lives like an artist. ‘Life,’ as Guattari has said elsewhere, ‘is like a performance, one must construct it, work at it, singularize it’ (1989c: 20). It is an ongoing aesthetico-existential process. ‘As we weave and unweave our bodies . . from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does the artist weave and unweave his image’ (oyce, 1986: 159). ln The Three Ecologies it is artists who provide us with the most profound insights into the human condition, not professional scientists or psychoanalysts. Goethe, Proust, Joyce, Artaud and Beckett are all cited, but there are many others. Biichner, for example, whose Lenz is a classic study in schizophrenia long before the term was invented and has been described as ‘proof that poetic utterances can anticipate scientific advances by decades’,13 or Sacher-Masoch, whose Venus in Furs diagnosed an entire condition to which he reluctantly gave his name.la

The best artists don’t repeat themselves, they start over and over again from scratch, uncertain with each new attempt precisely where their next experiment will take them, but then suddenly, spontaneously and unaccountably, as the painter Francis Bacon has observed, ‘there comes something which your instinct seizes on as being for a moment the thing which you could begin to develop’.ls Life is a work in progress, with no goal in sight, only the tireless endeavour to explore new possibilities, to respond to the chance event - the singular point - that takes us off in a new direction. As Bacon once remarked, ‘l always think of myself not so much as a painter but as a medium for accident and chance.’15

So, Guattari has extended his definition of ecology beyond merely environmental concerns to include human subjectivity itself, but what about social relations? It is all very well for people to become mental ecologists, to live their lives like a work of art in a state of pure, creative autoreferentiality , but the question arises as to how they can then work together, collectively, in a unified struggle against IWC’s damaging effect on society. Is it not the case that processes of singularization that actively multiply differences make any mass movement impossible?

People are not yet as pacified and domesticated as IWC would like them to be. As early as 1977, Guattari observed that ‘ever-widening social groups are not content to go on as they always have. An increasing number of people are beginning to reject certain forms of consumerism. To exhortations to acquire more cars, more private houses, more household machines, more ready-made entertainment and, in order to do so, to work harder, join the rat race, wear oneself out before one’s time, they reply, "What’s the point? Who does it help?"‘ (1984: 251). These people obviously share a similar sense of alienation from the capitalist consensus, but how can they act collectively to alter their circumstances? ‘Rather than looking for a stupefying and infantalizing consensus,’ he proposes in The Three Ecologies, ‘it will be a question in the future of cultivating a dissensus.’

Guattari’s finely nuanced, radically dissensual approach to social ecology requires the collective production of unpredictable and untamed ‘dissident subjectivities’ rather than a mass movement of like-minded people.

Work on oneself, in as much as one is a collective singularity; construct and in a permanent way re-construct this collectivity in a multivalent liberation project. Not in reference to a directing ideology, but within the articulations of the Real. Perpetually recomposing subjectivity and praxis is only conceivable in the totally free movement of each of its components, and in absolute respect of their own times - time for comprehending or refusing to comprehend, time to be unified or to be autonomous, time of identification or of the most exacerbated differences.’ (Guattari and Negri, l99O: 120)

As he makes clear in The Three Ecologies, there will be moments when eco-activists work together, and other times when they drift apart again. The important thing is that they do not have a leader directing their activity.17 The Three Ecologies was written before the Internet had fully developed into the powerful recruitment tool it is today, but Guattari was not unaware of the ‘proliferation of spontaneous and co-ordinated groups’ using the more rudimentary French Minitel system.rs It is one instance in which technological advancements may work for the collective good, leading to globally organized autonomous action and short-lived but effective affinity groups in which ‘the intensity of the minority’s feelings can be revealed to the majority by the minority engaging in civil disobedience’ (Carter, 1999: 258). Dissensus is principally a call for the revival of individual competence as a social force, for the development of new, ‘egalitarian, decentralized, participatory democracies, orientated towards an environmentally sustainable way of living’ (Carter, 1999: 300).

There is of course a tension at work here between solidarity and dissensus. It requires that a plurality of disparate groups come together in a kind of unified disunity, a pragmatic solidarity without solidity; what one might call, for want of a better word, ‘fluidarity’. The common enemy - IWC - has become so ubiquitous, and its deleterious effect on the planet so apparent, that no strata of society is immune from its effects. This is what makes ecology - or ecosophy - such a potentially radical force in the world. We are all of us prey to environmental degradation, we are all stranded on Spaceship Earth.

A capitalism that does not exploit resources - be they natural or human - is as yet unthinkable. A capitalism that is symbiotic rather than parasitic may never be possible. As Gregory Bateson points out, for too long humanity has adopted ‘survival of the fittest’ as its maxim - and this is taken to its extreme by free-market competition - whereas if humanity is to survive it must reconfigure this goal into that of ‘survival of organism plus environment’ (Bateson, 7972: 499). At present the major capitalist countries are also the major polluters of the Earth. The mass media creates a climate of unquestioning passivity. The role of television in perpetuating the perception that ‘environmental problems’ occur in some ill-defined elsewhere can only work in IWC’s interest.re But even if governments and industry acted immediately to reduce the global emission of greenhouse gases, for instance, it would still take hundreds of years for the Earth’s ecological equilibrium to be restored. Unfortunately, immediate political action is unlikely when the worst polluting nations continue to insist that ‘emissions trading’ occurs under free-market principles.

From a cosmic perspective the human race is at the beginning of the evolutionary process. There is time for life to spread beyond the Earth throughout the entire Cosmos, provided the planet’s biosphere isn’t destroyed. While it is trapped on Spaceship Earth, and now that it has entered the nuclear and biotechnological age, our species remains vulnerable. In order for it to survive, the twenty-first century must be atheist in the best sense: a positive disbelief in God, concerned only with, and respectful of, terrestrial life. It will require the development of an immanent, materialist ethics, coupled with an atleist awareness of finitude, of the mortality of the species, the planet and the entire universe, and not an illusory belief in immortality, which is only a misplaced contempt for life.2o A proper understanding of our terrestriality and mortality does not imply any restriction of our horizons. There will always be new ways of life to be invented, for there are as many different ways of living as there are people; provided we rediscover our heterogeneity and resist the insidious normalization of our lives.

As Bateson has argued (1972: 495-505), an ecological struggle for survival is taking place in the domain of ideas. The task of every ecological analyst now is to promote ecologically ‘good’ ideas in the hope that these will prevail, through a process of natural selection, over ecologically ‘bad’ ideas that will prove fatal to the planet. The Three Ecologies is full of ecologically ‘good’ ideas. It is a modest proposal that we should protect not only the Earth and society, but also our own rare and singular minds from the encroachments of Integrated World Capitalism.

#### Make no mistake, this is not metaphorical—all of us are potential Professor Challengers, especially you three. The presence of judges is supposedly what makes policy debate so unique and distinct from other academic spaces. Judges are positioned as mediators who neutrally separate themselves from the arguments at hand to determine the truth—not capital-T truth, of course, just little contingent truths that change every debate. Every other round, someone reminds us that single rounds don’t matter, no one remembers the content of debates, just the process of submitting our claims up for evaluation. “It doesn’t really matter who is right. It matters that it needs mediation.”

#### Mediation, however, is far from a neutral process. The mediator “is the logistic category par excellence of whiteness”—the ability to separate one’s self out from the world to evaluate it as objectively as possible turns subjectivity into the subject, a self-contained and rational individual—much like Challenger—whose existence is predicated on the brutal clearing of anything outside the white, straight, neurotypical man. You see, “the truth is, the wilderness was cleared, but never quite colonized. And that is why whiteness is alive and well. To police a job half-done.”

#### You should instead position yourselves as immediators, favoring the ethical co-creation of new collective subjectivities over the violence of impartiality. After all, “the blackening of the earth requires the production of something entirely other than me, or you.”

Manning, 22—professor of philosophy and cinema at Concordia University (Erin, “Out of the Clear,” e-flux #125, March 2022, dml) [non-underlined portions of this card reference sexual assault]

How we organize bodies, we who sidle whiteness, how we excise (from clear sight) the ravages of an earth desecrated, of a people brutally murdered—these are the workings of logistics. Logistics mediate existence by keeping it at arm’s length, soothing us into believing that we are not responsible. The deaths are newsworthy, and we’re sorry, but we must move on. It’s not really about us and in any case, there’s nothing we can do about it. Let’s get a mediator and sort this out!

At arms length, we see these workings—the cleared forest, the dying planet, the dead children—as somehow disconnected. We do not acknowledge the felling of the trees as the wanton destruction of all that transversally connects. And yet logistics, in its power of mediation, is all about the forests. It’s all about the cotton planted in their wake.

The ghostly outline of Proulx’s pine table haunts the residential school, its absence equal to the absence of education. Because what the residential school really does is unteach. Taking the place of pedagogy, what is practiced here is theft. Theft of thought, of imagination. This theft is a rape. A physical rape, a sexual aggression, but also a conceptual rape, a clearing—“to snatch, to grab, to carry off by force”—of all that lives in the abyss of what has been left behind. Rape, relation severed, cuts the fragile interwoven threads of existence, wresting life from life-living, from the more-than that gives it its spirited and spiritual contour. If body is land, if bodying is only ever worlding, what residential school does, in this most recent form of clearing, is sever this imbrication, leaving the body lifeless.

All that remains is the clearing. And a mess. But this can be handled. This is how mediation does its work, in the name of and as logistics. From here on in, things will be managed. Managers will be appointed to organize, to administer, the now-reduced environment. This science of loss—“which is to say the science of whiteness, or logistics”—is predicated on the end of sharing, on the destruction of the excessive share, the annihilation of that which exceeds the one-two form whose dramaturgy relies on the intervention of the mediator. The mediator will take the form of the “yellow eyebrows” in Proulx’s account, but it also need not take a simple human form. Repetition of the same is the form it takes in a dramaturgy of extinction.

Scene 3

Clearing produces property. Property produces dispossession. “All property is loss because all property is the loss of sharing.” The accursed share of all that exceeds interpersonality, mediation, whiteness, logistics, all that cannot be accounted for, sickens the field. And sometimes rejuvenates it. The force of the transindividual, of all that exceeds and precedes the individual, does rewild. But its vitality is weakened, and as perception is honed to single out the individual over the field, the human increasingly becomes the focal point, becoming synonymous with life. This is how the logistics of genocide—the genocide of relation—does its work.

The genocide of relation can never be traced back, quite. Relation cannot be propertied. What is lost cannot be parsed. The yellow eyebrows have a role to play, of course, and we could call on the archbishop for that missing apology, but the truth is, it was never just one. He was never just the one. He is a logistical pattern, a commitment to the dramaturgy of (white) man as self-centered orchestrator of existence cleared.

Scene 4

Logistics: the slave ship, but also the body-as-individual. “The first odious vessel produced by and for logistics is not the slave ship, but the body—flesh conceptualized—which bears the individual-in-subjection.”

In the clearing, man is revealed as the loss of relation. Humanism is born here, in the empty space of the stolen land, in the vast expanse of the 1+1, the infinite regress of nothing-in-between.

How to fill the emptiness? How to create an account for all that is lost and yet claimed?

Mediation offers to fill the shape of the between. Mediation as the figure of what comes between, of what fills that “empty” space. The adjuster, the divorce lawyer, the priest, the government agent.

A quick intervention to make sense of all that has become unclear, to fill in the lines, to provide context.

And perhaps this does make things clearer, perhaps we understand each other a bit better now that we’ve mediated all we couldn’t make sense of in the vast emptiness of our difference. But the problem is: mediation never goes away. It sits there, inert but active, facilitating the ongoing impoverishment relation by adhering to all that takes the shape of the 1+1 of body-as-individual, of interpersonality. Because in advance of the gesture of inserting the mediating influence, he is already there. Long before the divorce, he hovers, betweener, judging, parsing, condoning, condemning. His take doesn’t really matter. What matters is that he remains in the offing, holding things apart.

Mediation is the father of the control society. It is the way surveillance takes on a personality from the outside in. Whether formally or informally, mediation sets the tone for an interpersonality that, by definition, can only be lived at a distance. Playing at impartiality, mediation haunts the surround, reducing it to what is already known, what is already valued, what is already within the scope of the expressible. 2+1, always less than 3, mediation is passive aggressor, poised for judgment, always in the know (while it listens carefully). Because its role is to keep existence in its track, on its logistical path. It doesn’t really matter who is right. It matters that it needs mediation.

Mediation knows best, trampling on any detail of middling, sewing interactivity into a twoness without excess. Hardening the between of interpersonality into the amplification of the self-same, mediation lodges at the interstice, cutting it into a hyphen, setting up its colony on the bridge. Settler, it speaks from a place it has never had to truly encounter because its role is only to order things apart.

Harney and Moten might speak of mediation with the same disdain as they do of logistics, which they call the “science of whiteness.” Mediation is the logistic category par excellence of whiteness. It has no content, is not in itself an agent of transformation, does nothing but cannibalize the life it parses. Its intervention happens in the beat of enter and retreat, leaving the uneasy twoness of existence to sort itself out. In the name of property and propriety, mediation solves all uncertainties of zoning. That it never actually leaves is its dirty secret.

But the logistics of mediation can only fail. The interface is shaky—we know this both from the endemic code 404, page not found, and from the impossibility of truly domesticating our surrounds. Ultimately, the squirrels, the black flies, the birds, the worms, the fungi, the weeds, the viruses, the hackers cannot be kept in their place. The disarray is handled, of course, with more mediation, with more logistics.

The interface claims a distance, a secure between-two that repeats the refrain of nature colonized, of culture denatured. It promises a security of inhabitation, a zone that can be controlled, a slip through which we can safely enter, we who claim the place. Here, in the logistics of passage that beats at the cadence of the one-two, me-you, the outcome is always the same. Police to subjugate. Code to organize. Clear to colonize.

Logistics aims to straighten us out, untangle us, and open us to its usufruct, its improving use; such access to us, in its turn, improves the flow line, the straight line. And what logistics takes to be the shortest distance between us requires emplotting us as bodies in space where interiority can be imposed even as the capacity for interiority can be denied, in the constant measure and regulation of flesh and earth.

Scene 5

Deleuze and Guattari speak of man as the white wall of the black hole of existence. Think landscape painting, especially the kind that excises that very life that breathed it into existence. If you’re not familiar, search for “Canadian art.” And if you don’t know the history of the mansplaining of the Canadian landscape, search for the Group of Seven, the early twentieth-century Canadian landscape painters, and notice not only the ubiquity of the vast open, uninhabited space, notice the clearing. Very little has changed over the last hundred years. We still see Canada through the clear, in the emptiness of nature cultured.

The denuded land, the empty north, is how we art ourselves still today, we who property the land. The Group of Seven, those painters of the land pristine, of the great white north, the painters of the land of the (single) pine and of the distant ridges, they are still with us, still managing the imagination, orchestrating the field, playing the dramaturgy of extinction. Logistics are also aesthetic (if not artful).

The white man is a specter. That is to say, the white man is without content, without shape. He is the shift in form that allows all takings-place to be propertied inhabitations, which is to say, sites already claimed. This is whiteness: the pretense that the lines that demarcate the boundary between me and you protect you, protect me, from the wilderness of all that cannot be contained (and must be kept at bay). The truth is, the wilderness was cleared, but never quite colonized. And that is why whiteness is alive and well. To police a job half-done.

Scene 6

Mediation makes many promises. It promises clarity: think, drop-down menu. It promises fairness: think, divorce court. It promises health: think, therapy. The gesture is cast as innocuous. A simple third, a neutral agent. A little bit of reason. A moment of distance. An interlude so that things can be tied up again and smooth functioning can resume. A representation of the useful.

But what is it to insert distance into a field of relation if not violence of the highest degree? Whose distance? At what cost? To what ends?

Guattari fights against this at every turn, refusing mediation either in politics or in psychiatry. Schizoanalysis is the proposition, a call for a transversal operation that breaks the pretense of neutrality in the encounter. A therapeutics of transversality. No more triangle. No more transference. Schizoanalysis is the event of the encounter itself, the practice of encountering. To be in the relation is to have been changed by it. What this looked like: a years-long institutional arrangement housed at a clinic called La Borde in the north of France whereby to be in the therapeutic encounter was to live with the effects of encounters in the everyday and to learn from them how to continue to live. Nothing very complicated, really. But infinitely complex in its transversality. Because to live in the encounter, to allow ourselves to be changed by it, is to be continuously undone, and to be sensitive to all that comes alive in that undoing.

Who we are is a question that can only really be asked (and answered) by the mediator. The mediator, after all, looks in from outside to tell us how our actions are affecting the world. Without the mediator there is no steady external gaze, no calm interface for the mirroring. That’s why “who we are” is always a white question, a question of whiteness, of colonization.

Blackness, write Harney and Moten, is not a thing, or a state (of being). It is the way the doing expresses. It is not a subject, not a person, not a property. It is a field. It is the excess on itself of a body claimed, blackened by hate. Blackness is the celebration of refusing to claim, to be claimed. “Meanwhile, Michael Brown is like another fall and rise through man—come and gone, as irruption and rupture, to remind us not that black lives matter but that black life matters; that the absolute and undeniable blackness of life matters; that this is not a judgment of value but a description of a field of activity that obliterates the worldly distinction between the organic and the inorganic.” Blackness is not the simple descriptor of what has been enfleshed. Blackness cannot be mediated into a form imposed (exposed). Blackness is the force of living that exceeds colonization, its accursed share. And in that sense, the wildness of the surround, it too is black. As is the earth.

This is what Guattari means when he entreats us to move from schizoanalysis as a therapeutic-political dispositif, an agencement more than an apparatus, a moving-forth of encounterings afield, toward the transversality of what he calls the “three ecologies.” These three ecologies, the mental/conceptual, the environmental, and the social, are the overlap, as I see it, of a commitment to a blackening of the earth, out of the clear.

(Necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed, man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. The world is posed as the way to live on the earth as the individual is posed as the way to live in the world. To live in the world as an individual is therefore to be logistic, and to be logistic is to settle into a rhythm that kills, to beat out that rhythm over the undercommon track that keeps (giving away) its own measure.

Scene 7

Guattari wrote The Three Ecologies in what have come to be known as his winter years. The winter years came after a sustained attempt at working with the Green Party in the aftermath of the terrible letdown of post-1968 politics in France. This attempt to connect to state politics left Guattari with a sour taste. He knew better, of course, than to trust state politics to be a site of transformation. Schizoanalysis had been the wager that there were other ways—that to work “in common,” “toward the common” is, ultimately, always to commit to the logic of mediation. In The Three Ecologies, he makes a plea to invent new ways of being committed to and involved in the urgent call to transversalize experience, ways that move beyond how the state lays claim to existence:

In the domain of social ecology there will be times of struggle in which everyone will feel impelled to decide on common objectives and to act “like little soldiers,” by which I mean like good activists. But there will simultaneously be periods of resingularisation in which individual and collective subjectivities will take their marbles and go home without a thought for collective goals, and in which creative expression as such will take precedence. This new ecosophical logic—and I want to emphasize this point—resembles the manner in which an artist may be led to alter his work after the intrusion of some accidental detail, an event-incident that suddenly makes his initial project bifurcate, making it drift [dériver] far from its previous path, however certain it had once appeared to be.

There is an echo in this ecosophic call to Moten and Harney:

Rather than dissipate our preoccupation with how we live and breathe, we need to defend our ways in our persistent practice of them. It’s not about taking the streets; it’s about how, and about what, we take to the streets. What would it be and what would it mean for us jurisgeneratively to take to the streets, to live in the streets, to gather together another city right here, right now?

Ecosophic logic is a refusal of the clearing, of the ways in which we seek to inhabit the space already colonized. It recognizes the lure, and understands the commitment to change that the gesture of taking the streets embodies. But ecosophic logic asks a different question: What if instead we practiced living by creating new conditions that didn’t center us, that didn’t inadvertently redeem that central and self-centering figure of man and its mediating logistics? What if we painted into the dérive of artfulness’s angle on experience? What if we moved at the pace of that accidental detail tangled with the weeds we have been wasting so much time clearing?

Ecosophic logic is an urgent call to refuse the ongoing clearing that denies, decries, and violates the force of blackness in the ongoing genocide of all that resists the count. To refuse does not mean to face and challenge. Frontality, the neurotypical activity par excellence, only cements into place what is already there, what is already claiming the ground of existence. To refuse means to move into the accursed share of life-living twisting in the troubled interstice, to move with that anarchic share of existence that keeps giving life.

For life-living to thrive, life has to be activated at those interstices that exceed man. Life’s expression as tangle has to be attuned to from the edges in. Conditions have to be crafted to honor what is not about us. This is what the First Nations in Barkskins of course already knew. And for this they were cleared. To see, to feel, what was always already there, to pulse with a force of life-living that cannot be claimed—owed or owned—this was always the crime.

Scene 8

The many years Guattari spent practicing schizoanalysis, which is to say, living at La Borde and encountering, daily, the shape of an existence unmediated, an existence committed, always, to a refusal of normopathy—these are what he takes into the project of the three ecologies. And it is specifically the orientation of La Borde toward neurodiversity, I believe, that makes it necessary to underscore what he calls the mental, or conceptual, ecology as the inflecting force that must, and will, change the contours of the environmental and the social. La Borde taught him this: to skirt the question of the subject leaves the black hole wide open, filled to the brim with neurotypicality, whiteness.

In the sickness that has befallen the earth—the ongoing genocide of all that eludes the count—subjectivity, too, has fallen ill. Replaced by the face of man, given the guise of whiteness in all its logistical powers of mediation, subjectivity has been swallowed, engulfed by the subject. “The main feature of the colonial-capitalistic unconscious is the reduction of subjectivity to its subject’s experience.” But subjectivity, as Guattari understands it, is nothing other than its ongoing production. It is not the subject. It is the transversal, the emergent unmediated middle, the collectivity that must never be reduced to the one. This is why, for a renewed project of the earth, or as Moten and Harney would have it, for the blackening of the earth—“we are the moving, blackened, blackening earth”—“it will be a question of literally reconstructing the modalities of ‘group-being’ [l’être-en-groupe], not only through ‘communicational’ interventions but through existential mutations driven by the motor of subjectivity.”

To construct modalities for group-being is a call for an aesthetics of sociality which exceeds the 1+1 of interpersonality. Group-being, or what Guattari refers to as the “group subject,” is not countable. The group subject is never the sum of its parts. As solitary as it is multiplicitous, the group subject makes felt how subjectivity is produced in the excess on itself of coming into relation. The group subject is how the more-than of the relational field finds expression. It is the emergent collectivity of an expression of life-living shared (in its accursed excess), expression irreducible to the one, always beyond consensus. Without mediation, the group subject is activated in the renunciation of summing up. To produce the modalities for this excess of existence requires a mutation on existence itself, a mutation that in every sense rethinks subjectivity as a position.

The group subject reminds us that what we produce is never solely ours. We are not simply our-selves. We are fieldings of complex imbrication. Any other account of experience is subjected to mediation, organized by logistics. Anarchival to the core, the production of subjectivity is not an account of a life contained. It is not condensable to something like identity. It is not reducible to the form of the human. It is always more-than, always in movement, a motor or conduit of a worlding.

The production of subjectivity bodies in the same gesture that it refuses to be a body, an “individual-in-subjection.” That is to say: in the production of subjectivity the bodying is always a being of relation. Always in movement, it does its living in the unlimited exposure that exceeds any body-world separation. Subjectivity is not inside. It is not in me. It is out of me.

Rather than speak of the “subject,” we should perhaps speak of components of subjectification, each working more or less on its own. This would lead us, necessarily, to re-examine the relation between concepts of the individual and subjectivity, and, above all, to make a clear distinction between the two. Vectors of subjectification do not necessarily pass through the individual, which in reality appears to be something like a “terminal” for processes that involve human groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines, etc. Therefore, interiority establishes itself at the crossroads of multiple components, each relatively autonomous in relation to the other, and, if need be, in open conflict.

“That abolition starts with the self.”

In the drift, subjectivity’s dérive is irreducible to the human. Active in the interval of worlds making themselves, subjectivity is never reducible to a subject. The production of subjectivity is the activity of the interstice: vector, not form. Schizoanalysis works at this uneasy juncture. The task of schizoanalysis is not to get between body and world, between-two. Its task is to make way for all that already populates the between, and to agitate, from within the field of relation, orientations already in germ. Fostering the germination, tending the field, schizoanalysis vectors the inflection.

The vectoring requires a subtraction from the open field of all that is still in potentia. Schizoanalysis culls from potential a shape, a way. This excision from process is a subtraction from infinitude to the finite. From the side of infinitude, in the field of immanence, Whitehead calls this activity that sparks a standing out of experience “importance.” From the side of finitude, in the field of activity, Whitehead calls it “expression”:

Expression is founded on the finite occasion. It is the activity of finitude impressing itself on its environment. Thus it has its origin in the finite; and it represents the immanence of the finite in the multitude of its fellows beyond itself. The two together, namely importance and expression, are witnesses both to the monistic aspect of the universe and to its pluralistic character. Importance passes from the world as one to the world as many; whereas, expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one.

Importance and expression function as intensifiers of experience, bringing into activity the singularity of a life that nonetheless continues to carry its anarchic share. In this account, the human is not singled out. There is no externalizing voice, no mediator. Arrows of experience are their own force, importance not a question of what matters to me, but of what actually (but always also in potentia) makes a difference.

Importance makes way for precision in experience. That is to say, importance is what fosters a certain specific angle of existence, allowing certain qualities of experience to take precedence over others. We have come to believe that mediation is necessary to parse experience. But as Whitehead emphasizes, the world is always in its own pursuit of amplification. Incessant clearing, colonialism without end, in the afterlife of slavery, results in systems out of kilter. Ecological destruction has finally begun to register, centuries too late. The question of how to bring things into a metastability that is conducive to life-living must involve a reckoning with the deadening force of mediation. We don’t need another apology. We need to get out of the way. The blackening of the earth requires the production of something entirely other than me, or you.

Scene 9

The infraface of the three ecologies—“the world as one to the world as many … the world as many to the world as one”—is immediating. Immediation is not the opposite of mediation. Rather, it is the force of a thirdness irreducible to a between-two. Immediation is the more-than, the n+1 that is by necessity n-1, one as many, many as one, the qualitative force of an uncountability that diagonalizes to give rise to what else moves in the relation.

The production of subjectivity is immediating to the degree that it is not produced by something outside itself. Immediating, always at once body and world, its own perspective. That is to say, its angle on existence is not ours, cannot be reduced to us. The production of subjectivity is a making-conceptual of existence. It is an attuning to the deadly violence of the body-world split produced in the wake of the clearing.

There are not three ecologies. There is one ecology multiply intertwined. To get to the potential of what the three ecologies in their transversality offer, the production of subjectivity must be attended to. We have failed each other at the juncture of the production of subjectivity in particular, and nothing will be possible without that shift. In the words of The Invisible Committee,

the exhaustion of natural resources is probably much less advanced than the exhaustion of subjective resources, of vital resources, that is afflicting our contemporaries. If so much satisfaction is derived from surveying the devastation of the environment it’s largely because this veils the frightening ruin of subjectivities. Every oil spill, every sterile plain, every species extinction is an image of our souls in rags, a reflection of our lack of world, of our intimate impotence to inhabit it.

To become in excess of a person, to activate the conditions for a life-living that worlds in the bodying, is a social and environmental act. The emergent sociality of becoming-environmental never happens through the clearing. In happens in the midst, black flies and all. The production of subjectivity in the transversality of the three ecologies is the way the more-than of nature naturing crafts a sociality ecosophically. A sociality, as Harney and Moten might say, all incomplete.

#### Vote aff to schizz the resolution. Immediators should ask not what the words of the resolution mean, but what they do. This practice looks towards alter-capitalist futures “in order to break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of [hu]mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our *selves*!”

Manning, 20—professor of philosophy and cinema at Concordia University (Erin, “Cephalopod Dreams: Finance at the Limit,” *For a Pragmatics of the Useless*, Chapter 8, 289-296, dml)

Schizoanalysis is an alter-economic practice: its work is to unmoor the financialization of the individual as metric of preexisting value. The schizz cuts through the middle, neurodiverse in its call for the more-than. “No more normopaths!” it howls. How-else-with-and?

The schizz of the schizoanalytic practice must never be reindividualized by setting up the figure of the lone schizophrenic, or any figure, as its cipher. Contrary to some interpretations of Anti-Oedipus, nowhere do Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari idealize psychosis or schizophrenia. As everywhere in their philosophy, the aim is not to moralize but to couple the pragmatic with the speculative, asking how processes unfold and what immanent valuations run through them. The differentiation they make between schizophrenia as process and schizophrenia as entity is vital in this regard. The schizophrenic entity “can only be defined in relation to the arrests, the continuations in the void, or the finalist illusions that repression imposes on the process itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 379). The schizophrenic process, or what they call the schizoid pole, refers to the manner in which desire invests itself in sociality. At the schizoid pole, knowledge schizophrenizes, passing beyond its own axiomatics, creating new operations. “Figureschizzes” are produced “that are no longer either figurative or structured” (371). These two operations, the schizophrenic entity and the schizophrenic process, are in continuous co-composition, the schizoid pole always also in proximity with the threat of the pathological. Desire schizzes, uncoupling pathology from process. Desire, the impersonal force that activates socialities in germ, is the revolutionary activity through which new lifeways are produced, schizzing all the while.

What distinguishes the schizophrenic from the neurotic is psychosis. What is of interest to Deleuze and Guattari is that psychosis cannot be oedipalized.

The neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary . . . is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such apolitics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces—the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: orphans (no daddymommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories). (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi)

The schizz must always be considered in terms of what it can do, not in terms of what it defines. It is from this vantage point that the figure of the schizophrenic must be understood in the account of capitalism and schizophrenia, with Oedipus always as the overdetermining pull to the neurotic replaying, in all pathologies, of what holds them to the narration of a preexisting structure. Oedipus should not be considered an actual formation, however. The Oedipus complex is a tendency in potentia: “it must be actualized in a neurotic formation as a derived effect of the actual factor” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 129). Psychosis schizzes Oedipus. This is why Freud disliked schizophrenics: “For we must not delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers— ‘an undesirable resemblance’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 23).1 In schizzing the “neurotic territoriality of Oedipus,” psychosis produces new circuits (136). There is no promise attached to these circuits. They could just as well fold back on themselves, returning to all the forms of neuroticization that reduce psychotics to the apparently unmoored, disjointed paranoid figure psychiatric institutions lock up. “Perhaps there is only one illness, neurosis, the Oedipal decay against which all the pathogenic interruptions of the process should be measured” (319).

In pushing up against what can be extracted from the schizophrenic experience that resists the neuroticization imposed on it, Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question that most troubled Jean Oury and was central to the work at the La Borde clinic: “How does one avoid the institution’s re-forming an asylum structure, or constituting perverse and reformist artificial societies, or residual paternalistic or mothering pseudo families?” (319). What techniques can be put in place to schizz the institution’s penchant for all that retriangulates?

Urgently necessary is the decoupling of experience from the pathological valuations of the deficit model. As in the wider field of neurodiversity, the aim is not cure but a commitment to the singular ways difference expresses itself and the qualities of desire, knowledge, and creation it produces. “A true politics of psychiatry, or antipsychiatry, would consist therefore in the following praxis: (1) undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness; (2) liberating the schizoid movement of deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound tendency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 321). Against normopathy, schizoanalysis never does its work from outside the event. Sensitive to the schizz, it moves with it, following its tendencies. “Foucault announced an age when madness would disappear, not because it would be lodged within the controlled space of mental illness (‘great tepid aquariums’), but on the contrary because the exterior limit designated by madness would be overcome by means of other flows escaping control on all sides, and carrying us along” (321).

From this vantage point, schizophrenia shifts from entity to force, desiringproduction its motor. “Like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines” (5). There is no longer “a specific, identifiable schizophrenic entity” (6). What there is instead is a practice of the schizz that attunes to the multiplicity of “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself” (15). Multiplicity in differential, the schizoid pole explodes the great tepid aquariums of our pathological imaginations. Beyond pathology, there are no criteria. “It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way” (15). Is this madness? Or is the psychosis to be found in the imposed adherence of systems on worlds too differential, too multiple to tame?

The schizophrenic is the limit case of existence that troubles our certainties as regards the stability of subjectivity. To repeat the mantra that drives chapter 5: “A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our *selves*!” (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi).2 Schizoanalysis is not a practice of the individual. It is not a practice of pathologization, of singling out the one whose neurology will invariably be considered a deficit. Schizoanalysis is a practice of the event where I, even schizo-I, is not yet.

That the schizophrenic refutes the limited envelope of the individual is certainly part of the story. But the work of schizoanalysis is not done on the body (of the schizophrenic) per se. The work is done in the relation where the phonic leaves its resonant traces. The schizz, the effect of the schizophrenizing of experience, cuts subjectivity as we know it, subjectivity as the claim to the human (the category that excludes the neurodiverse, and all qualities and forces of life-yet-tobe-invented that threaten the I as white, colonial, neurotypical being).

Capital

Capitalism breaks bodies, its devaluation of qualitative difference at the level of aesthetic sociality so complete that bodies barely hold up. Exhaustion, anxiety, depression, and all their offshoots are everywhere palpable. Capitalism breeds paranoia, the ground so uneven, our bearings so unsteady, that we fold into a selfpossession that leaves no room for what exceeds us. Limited by the hardening of our edges, we become more enclosed in our-selves, less turned to an outside that would revivify the more-than that courses through us. This is what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to when they talk about how capitalism produces the neurotic, and, at the extreme, the “sick schizo” (1983, 362).

A schizoeconomics is committed to the schizzing of capitalism. Its challenge is to work in careful attunement to capital’s own infinite appetite for circulation and deviation.3 Flows, processes, detours are, after all, what capital is made of, its movements faster, more mad, and often more creative than we would like to admit. To compose with capital is to coincide with its movements to schizz the more-than that runs through them, connecting to the speculative share of its own decidedly more-than human process.

The cutting edge of capitalism is in the financial markets, which have evolved forms of abstract capital so abstruse, contingent, and objectively undecidable that it is impossible to get an effective grip on them. They run according to their own process, and sometimes run away with themselves, periodically crashing and burning. The financialized economy is beyond the human pale: beyond full human comprehension and beyond effective human control. It is a self-driving machine, operating more and more abstractly, with no one in particular at the steering wheel. It was created by the human, but not in its own image, emerging rather as a monstrous offspring that turns back to engulf its maker and drive away with it. (Massumi 2017c, 9)

To schizz capitalism is to develop an account of quality that can discern the difference between cuts that breed the count of assets, and cuts that revalue value. In its infinite capacity for deviation, capital is a powerful adversary. The aim of finance at the limit is always alter-capitalist, but it in no way purports that there is an outside of capital as we know it. To schizz capital is to watch another limb begin to grow elsewhere. Alter-capitalist futures will be built of more than the schizzing of capital: they will be led by the development of practices that exert the force of other ways of living in a logic that refuses the tenets that undergird capitalism—the relentless drive to quantitative increase, inexorable growth and inequality, the capture of life intensities for profit. Practicing the schizz begins there, in the midst, asking what kinds of techniques can be crafted for those other logics, logics that sidle, in approximation of proximity, an aesthetic sociality of blackness, experimenting with the minor that runs through a sociality born in the being of relation. This is to say that the practice of the schizz is never structural, never aimed at a totality, as though something as stable as capital-as-structure existed and could directly be taken down. The practice is transversal, operating in the circulation of flows themselves. This modest aim may seem useless. Indeed, it is: an ethos of the pragmatics of the useless runs through it. It claims nothing as regards grand schemes of productivity. Its proposition: to practice the art of life-living at the differential of minor socialities in a livingloving that angles toward the instauration of new modes of (merest) existence. Schizoeconomies will not come into themselves once and for all. They will always need to be (re)invented, at every turn bringing with themselves new techniques for practice unlimited.

Capital is crossed by lines of escape, and this is what finance at the limit exploits. “Capitalism is continually cutting off the circulation of flows, breaking them and deferring the break, but these same flows are continually overflowing, and intersecting one another according to schizzes that turn against capitalism and slash into it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 376). Cleaving capitalism from within, the schizz produces social fields that may operate only for an instant, but nonetheless provoke the seeding of a dif­ferent mode of investment, and with it dif­ferent operations of value. Paranoia will always be around the corner, counting its coins, but as Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments demonstrates, minor practices of the art of life-living have always existed, even under the worst conditions: “The wild idea that animates this book is that young black women were radical thinkers who tirelessly imagined other ways to live and never failed to consider how the world might be otherwise” (2019, xv).

“The revolutionary investment of desire” schizzes worlds into otherwise-living (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 378). Desiring-production is the force against which capitalism has no power: unquantifiable, in a logic of the relation of nonrelation, desire as force too impersonal to claim bends the pathways toward intensities for which no preexisting code, no count, exists. This is why the schizophrenic as conceptual persona is vital to the project of schizzing capital for Deleuze and Guattari: the schizoid pole is the pole of desiring-production and, as such, “is revolutionary, in the very sense that the paranoiac method is reactionary and fascist; and it is not these psychiatric categories, freed of all familialism, that will allow us to understand the politico-economic determinations, but exactly the opposite” (1983, 379–80). Revolutionary desire is a practice, not a tool. It does its work transversally, moving waywardly where we might least expect it. Writing of Mattie, a young laundress, Hartman culls from the anarchival force of the photographs that nourish her critical fabulation the force of what desire can do in the face of racial capital’s devaluations:

Mattie has been credited with nothing, deemed unfit for every role except servility, condemned in advance of wrongdoing, and destined to be a minor figure even in her own verified history. To esteem her acts, to regard rather than vilify Mattie’s restive longing, is to embrace the anarchy—the complete program of disorder, the abiding desire to change the world, the tumult, upheaval, open rebellion—attributed to wayward girls. It is to attend to other forms of social life, which cannot be reduced to transgression or to nothing at all, and which emerge in the world marked by negation, but exceed it. (2019, 62)

Mobilizing the schizz, inventing schizoanalytic techniques for practices of the event, requires diligence as regards capital’s (de)valuation of existence. Techniques must be invented to learn to attune to the difference between finance unlimited (neoliberal capital) and finance at the limit (schizoeconomy), to become sensitized to what sanctions the extreme deterritorialization of capital on one end of the spectrum and empowers the infrathin registering of the ineffable on the other.

Deleuze and Guattari speak of capitalism’s process of production as unleashing “an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism’s limit” (1983, 34). Capitalism is a movement that skirts the limit, continuously coming up against the dangers of crossing the threshold: “it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit” (34). This is even more clearly the case today than when Deleuze and Guattari underscored it in the late 1960s. Neoliberal capital is the flow of all flows. As Brian Massumi writes: “The ‘capitalist process’ is how the capitalist system dips into its own immanent outside to draw out new potentials for its becoming, or continuing self-constitution” (2018, 11).

How to invent platforms for schizoeconomic finance at the limit that do not simply facilitate capital’s seemingly infinite capacity to capitalize on process for monetary gain? Precapitalist marginal economies may give us a clue. For their operations, unlike those of capital, are rich with emergent sociality. The notion of the penultimate is vital to understanding how limit and threshold are mobilized to engender the being of relation in these early economies. “Take two abstract groups, one of which (A) gives seeds and receives axes, while the other (B) does the opposite. What is the collective evaluation of the objects based on? It is based on the idea of the last objects received, or rather receivable, on each side” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 437). The receivability of the objects in the account above refers not to the last object received but to “the penultimate, the next to the last, in other words, the last one before the apparent exchange loses its appeal for the exchangers, or forces them to modify their respective assemblages, to enter another assemblage” (437). The seriality refers to the cycle the exchange produces. “The last as the object of a collective evaluation determines the value of the entire series. It marks the exact point at which the assemblage must reproduce itself, begin a new operation period or a new cycle, lodge itself on another territory, and beyond which the assemblage could not continue as such. This is indeed a next-to-the-last, a penultimate, since it comes before the ultimate” (438). The ultimate changes the assemblage and, with that change, produces a new series. The limit is here understood as “marking a necessary rebeginning,” while the threshold marks “an inevitable change” (438). “What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criteria and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series” (438).

In the marginal economy, exchange creates the conditions for an encounter that, each time anew, establishes an emergent valuation. “There is neither exchange value nor use value but rather an evaluation of the last by both parties (a calculation of the risk involved in crossing the limit), an anticipation-evaluation that takes into account the ritual character as well as the utilitarian, the serial character as well as the exchangist” (439). The immanent limit sets the stage for “a collective feeling out” that cannot be done in advance of the event (439). Both sides are altered not only by the actual exchange but by their collective retuning to the limit. What has been “exchanged” is more than an object. A sociality has been invented that accompanies the object, supplementing it with the allure of the event through which it came to value. The economic cannot be reduced to the exchange itself. It is a platform for relation that facilitates a process of collective feeling-out that intuitively responds to the intensifying approach of the penultimate. Deviations in the process will cause punctual redirection, but an immanent choreography is in place to assist the process in not tipping into a new assemblage. The potency of the penultimate is the sociality it carries through the system. Consider an argument between a couple. No matter how angry they are, the couple will argue with a collective feeling-out of a limit, intuitively aware that to cross the limit might very well untether the bonds that hold the relationship together. The argument might sidle that limit, but the couple will be careful not to allow the threshold to be breached. They will do this by holding back certain thoughts, by attuning to the texture not only of what is said but how it is said, listening for what might crack their collective carapace, exposing them to what they cannot bear to hear. If they do cross that limit, everything will be up for renegotiation, and their relationship might end. The penultimate is of course never precisely knowable in advance—it is best known in retrospect from the perspective of the ultimate (after the assemblage has tipped into a new one). Attending to the penultimate means being sensitive to the field of relation in composition. Holding the process to the internal texture of its schizz is a way of attuning to the quality of a limit, collectively composing the relation in relation. When the schizz does the work of attending to the penultimate, what it does is value the pulse of duration’s serial rhythm as minor sociality. An exchange happens but it is not here that the value is located. The value is operative in the collective feeling-out that attends to the event’s composition. This can look like nothing. It can look like a simple exchange between seeds and axes. But it’s much more than that: it is the staying-with of the complexity of a seriality lived not as a transaction but as a proposition for life-living itself.

#### While it should go without saying that schizoanalysis is a core topical aff, “rumor would have it that none of this is self-evident!” Another relationship to the topic is possible; one that disrupts the logistical motor that turns debaters—and judges—into new Professor Challengers. The three ecologies—mental, social, and environmental—are intimately connected, and changes in one ripple through the others. Voting aff expands the scope of “core antitrust laws” across the three ecologies in order to prohibit the homogenizing practices of the private sector which anticompetitively constrain non-capitalist domains of value.

Guattari, 89—draft dodger, terrible father, motorcycle enthusiast (Felix, *The Three Ecologies*, 64-69, dml)

I have already stressed that it is less and less legitimate that only a profit-based market should regulate financial and prestige-based rewards for human social activities, for there is a range of other value systems that ought to be considered, including social and aesthetic ‘profitability’ and the values of desire. Until now, these non-capitalist domains of value have only been regulated by the State; hence, for example, the esteem in which national heritage is held. We must stress that new social associations - such as institutions recognized for their social utility - should broaden the financing of a more flexible non-private, non-public Third Sector, which will be forced to expand continuously for as long as human labour gives way to machinization. Beyond recognizing a universal basic income - as a right rather than as some kind of ‘New Deal’ - the question becomes one of how to encourage the organization of individual and collective ventures, and how to direct them towards an ecology of resingularization. The search for an existential Territory or homeland doesn’t necessarily involve searching for one’s country of birth or a distant country of origin, although too often, nationalitarian movements (like the Irish or the Basques) have turned in on themselves due to exterior antagonisms, leaving aside other molecular revolutions relating to women’s liberation, environmental ecology, etc. All sorts of deterritorialized ‘nationalities’ are conceivable, such as music and poetry. What condemns the capitalist value system is that it is characterized by general equivalence, which flattens out all other forms of value, alienating them in its hegemony. On this basis we must if not oppose, at least superimpose instruments of valorization founded on existential productions that cannot be determined simply in terms of abstract labour-time or by an expected capitalist profit. The information and telematic revolutions are supporting new ‘stock exchanges’ of value and new collective debate, providing opportunities for the most individual, most singular and most dissensual enterprises. The notion of collective interest ought to be expanded to include companies that, in the short term, don’t profit anyone, but in the long term are the conduits of a processual enrichment for the whole of humanity. It is the whole future of fundamental research and artistic production that is in question here.

It must also be stressed that this promotion of existential values and the values of desire will not present itself as a fully-fledged global alternative. It will result from widespread shifts in current value systems and from the appearance of new poles of valorization. In this respect it is significant that, over the last few years, the most spectacular social changes have resulted from precisely these kinds of long-term shifts; on a political level in the Philippines or Chile, for example, or on a nationalitary level in the USSR.78 In these countries, thousands of value-system revolutions are progressively percolating their way up through society and it is up to the new ecological components to polarize them and to affirm their importance within the political and social relations of force.

There is a principle specific to environmental ecology: it states that anything is possible - the worst disasters or the most flexible evolutions [evolutionse n souplesse]. Natural Equilibriums will be increasingly reliant upon human intervention, and a time will come when vast programmes will need to be set up in order to regulate the relationship between oxygen, ozone and carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere. We might just as well rename environmental ecology machinic ecology, because Cosmic and human praxis has only ever been a question of machines, even, dare I say it, of war machines.8o From time immemorial ‘nature’ has been at war with life! The pursuit of mastery over the mechanosphere will have to begin immediately if the acceleration of techno-scientific progress and the pressure of huge population increases are to be dealt with.

In the future much more than the simple defence of nature will be required; we will have to launch an initiative if we are to repair the Amazonian ‘lung’, for example, or bring vegetation back to the Sahara. The creation of new living species – animal and vegetable - looms inevitably on the horizon, and the adoption of an ecosophical ethics adapted to this terrifying and fascinating situation is equally as urgent as the invention of a politics focused on the destiny of humanity.

As new stories of the permanent recreation of the world replace the narrative of biblical genesis, we can do no better than cite Walter Benjamin, condemning the reductionism that accompanies the primacy of information:

When information supplants the old form, storytelling, and when it itself gives way to sensation, this double process reflects an imaginary degradation of experience. Each of these forms is in its own way an offshoot of storytelling. Storytelling . . does not aim to convey the pure essence of a thing, like information or a report. It sinks the thing into the life of the storyteller, in order to bring it out of him again. Thus traces of the storyteller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to the clay vessel.sr

To bring into being other worlds beyond those of purely abstract information, to engender Universes of reference and existential Territories where singularity and finitude are taken into consideration by the multivalent logic of mental ecologies and by the group Eros principle of social ecology; to dare to confront the vertiginous Cosmos so as to make it inhabitable; these are the tangled paths of the tri-ecological vision.

A new ecosophy, at once applied and theoretical, ethico-political and aesthetic, would have to move away from the old forms of political, religious and associative commitment… Rather than being a discipline of refolding on interiority, or a simple renewal of earlier forms of ‘militancy’, it will be a multifaceted movement, deploying agencies [instances] and dispositives that will simultaneously analyse and produce subjectivity. A collective and individual subjectivity that completely exceeds the limits of individualization, stagnation, identificatory closure, and will instead open itself up on all sides to the socius, but also to the machinic Phylum, to techno-scientific Universes of reference, to aesthetic worlds, as well as to a new ‘pre-personal’ understanding of time, of the body, of sexuality. A subjectivity of resingularization that can meet head-on the encounter with the finitude of desire, pain and death. However, rumour would have it that none of this is self-evident! All sorts of neuroleptic cloaks [chapes] enshroud this subjectivity, concealing it from any intrusive singularity.82 Do we have to invoke History yet again? There is at least a risk that there will be no more human history unless humanity undertakes a radical reconsideration of itself. We must ward off, by every means possible, the entropic rise of a dominant subjectivity. Rather than remaining subject, in perpetuity, to the seductive efficiency of economic competition, we must reappropriate Universes of value, so that processes of singularization can rediscover their consistency. We need new social and aesthetic practices, new practices of the Self in relation to the other, to the foreign, the strange – a whole programme that seems far removed from current concerns. And yet, ultimately, we will only escape from the major crises of our era through the articulation of:

-a nascent subjectivity

-a constantly mutating socius

-an environment in the process of being reinvented.

In conclusion, it should be understood that the three ecologies originate from a common ethico-aesthetic discipline, and are also distinct from the point of view of the practices that characterize them. Their different styles are produced by what I call heterogenesis, in other words, processes of continuous resingularization. Individuals must become both more united and increasingly different. The same is true for the resingularization of schools, town councils, urban planning, etc.

By means of these transversal tools [c1e;6], subjectivity is able to install itself simultaneously in the realms of the environment, in the major social and institutional assemblages, and asymmetrically in the landscapes and fantasies of the most intimate spheres of the individual. The reconquest of a degree of creative autonomy in one particular domain encourages conquests in other domains - the catalyst for a gradual reforging and renewal of humanity’s confidence in itself starting at the most miniscule level. Hence this essay, which sets out, in its own way, to counter the pervasive atmosphere of dullness and passivity.s3

#### Don’t worry, Wichita State, we haven’t forgotten about you. If you’re wondering what your role is in the collective resingularization of subjectivity, here are some suggestions!

Manning, 20—professor of philosophy and cinema at Concordia University (Erin, “Practicing the Schizz,” *For a Pragmatics of the Useless*, Chapter 5, 196-197, dml)

Neurodiverse qualities of attention can make getting going an issue; spaZe emerged as a technique for activating study. How we practice matters, and no change can occur without practice. This includes practicing value differently. What we most want to avoid with 3e is any return to the service economy and any kind of transactional economic politics. 3e is about asking how else we can value beyond the economy of credit that orients education today. What is the credit we exchange in the name of neurotypicality, of whiteness? What kind of sociality can be crafted that honors that debt, too immense to ever repay, turning it into the gift of Glissant’s poetics of relation, a living practice that reminds us at every turn that we must consent not to be a single being (1997, 5, 27)?

We invite those of you who want to participate, who care to invent with us what else learning and living can be, to practice three modes of entry. We ask that you bring to the platform of exploratory learning one of these techniques:

knot: a paradox or temporary impasse in one’s work, life, thinking, or creative practice that might become newly productive if staged in a way that opens it to a collaborative exploration, in language or between language and other modes of expression.

juncture: a known conjunction reopened for further exploration through new techniques reconfiguring its potential; the juncture might be a theoretical perspective, a set of established techniques informing a particular practice, an already-operating collaboration or project, or an existing disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or intermedia platform, restaged with a new inflection.

vector: a move out from known junctures into a wander line that is oriented by a proposition, and in that sense directionally constrained, but is at the same time open-ended in way that invites new takings-form on the fly.

Platforms for relation are never set in stone. We only propose to begin here. Together we will see where the practice leads. What we know is this: platforms for relation are everywhere active in our everyday lives. We need to learn how to seed them across undercommoning environments. Through these platforms we need to germinate new practices, and to practice failing together. Content delivery is not what changes the conditions of experience. There is no production of desire there. What moves experience are practices that reorient the place of knowledge in experience, practices that ask how the being of relation produces the kind of transformative justice livingloving requires.